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Appellants Powderhorn Communities, LLC, and Heartland, LLC (hereinafter 
"Powderhorn"), submit this Reply Brief in response to the arguments set forth by Neighbors for 
Responsible Growth, et al. (hereinafter "Neighbors"), in its Respondent's Brief filed in this 
matter. For the reasons set forth below, Neighbors does not present any compelling or justifiable 
reason for this Court to refuse to grant Powderhorn the relief it seeks on appeal. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Powderhorn realleges and incorporates herein the Statement of the Case, Course of 
Proceedings, and Statement of Facts set forth in its opening brief. (Powderhorn Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 1-12.) 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
In its opening brief, Powderhorn set forth the standard of review arising in an appeal to 
this Court from a district court decision, where the district court was acting in its appellate 
capacity under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. (Powderhorn Appellants' Brief, pp. 13-
14.) Briefly stated, in an appeal from a district court decision, this Court considers the agency 
record independently of the district court's decision. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). With regard to questions of fact, the 
reviewing court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence. I.C. § 67-5279(1). Rather, the reviewing court defers to the agency's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Friends of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 196, 46 PJd at 13. 
"In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
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supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Price v. Payette County Bd. of 
County Comm 'rs, 13 I Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). 
An agency's decision may only be overturned by a reviewing court under the IDAPA 
where its findings: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's 
statutory authority; ( c) are made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) are not supported by substantial 
evidence; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC.§ 67-5279(3). The party 
attacking an agency's action must first illustrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in 
l.C. § 67-5279(3), and then must further demonstrate that a substantial right of the party has been 
prejudiced. J.C.§ 67-5279(4); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923,926 (1998). "There 
is a strong presumption of validity favoring the actions of the zoning agency when applying and 
interpreting its own ordinances." Evans v. Bd. Of Comm 'rs of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 
430, 50 P.3d 443, 445 (2002). 
B. Neighbors did not have the statutory authority to seek judicial review of the 
Kootenai Connty Board of Commissioner's decision to amend the County's 
Comprehensive Plan. 
Powderhorn, in its Appellants' Brief, set forth argument establishing that Neighbors was 
not entitled to seek judicial review of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioner's 
("Board's") decision to amend the County's Comprehensive Plan. (Powderhorn Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 14-24.) Powderhorn based its argument on the grounds, including but not limited to, 
(I) that Neighbors was not an affected person under the Local Land Use Planning Act; (2) that 
the Board's final Order of Decision constituted a legislative matter not subject to judicial review, 
and (3) that Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Comm 'rs did not provide an independent 
Appellant Powderhorn's Reply Brief 
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avenue for judicial review. (Powderhorn Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-16, 16-21, 21-24, 
respectively.) 
In response, Neighbors asserted that it was justified in seeking judicial review of the 
Kootenai County Board of Commissioner's ("Board's") decision to amend the County's 
Comprehensive plan because such an amendment is "an appealable agency action." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 13-23.) Specifically, Neighbors asserts on appeal that it has the right to 
seek judicial review of the Board's decision as an affected person within the meaning of the 
Local Land Use Planning Act pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-652l(l)(a)&(d). (Respondent's 
Brief, p.3.) Additionally and in the alternative, Neighbors argues that it is entitled to judicial 
review as a matter of right pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act because it is "a 
person aggrieved by a final order of an agency in a contested case" pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-
5270. (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) For the reasons set forth below, neither statute cited by 
Neighbors provides it with the authority to file a petition for judicial review of an amendment to 
a comprehensive plan. 
i, This Court's recent decision in Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 2008 
WL 803001, establishes that a party has no right to file a petition for judicial 
review of an amendment to a comprehensive plan. 
On March 27, 2008, subsequent to the filing of Powderhorn's opening brief, but prior to 
the filing of Neighbor's Respondent's Brief, this Court released its written decision in the case of 
Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 2008 WL 803001. This Court's opinion in Giltner Dairy 
is factually and procedurally on point with the facts of this case. Additionally, it is dispositive 
with respect to the issue of whether Neighbors had a right to file a petition for judicial review of 
an amendment to the County's Comprehensive Plan. 
Appellant Powderhorn's Reply Brief 
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In Giltner, a landowner, Golf Ranch, LLC, petitioned the Jerome County Planning and 
Zoning Commission to amend the Jerome County Comprehensive Plan with respect to certain 
property it owned from an A-1 Agricultural designation to an A-2 agricultural designation. 
Giltner, 2008 WL 803001 *I. The Commission recommended that the Jerome County Board of 
Commissioners deny Golf Ranch's request, but the Board nonetheless approved the request and 
effectuated a revised comprehensive plan map amendment. Id. A neighboring landowner, 
Giltner Dairy, LLC, filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision to amend the 
County's Comprehensive Plan. Id. The district court dismissed Giltner Dairy's petition for 
judicial review on the grounds that Giltner Dairy was not entitled to seek judicial review of the 
Board's decision to amend its comprehensive plan. Id. Giltner appealed to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Id. 
The issue presented to the Idaho Supreme Court was whether Giltner Dairy had a right to 
file a petition for judicial review of an amendment to a comprehensive plan map. Id. Giltner 
Dairy argued on appeal that it was entitled to judicial review pursuant to any one of three 
statutory provisions: (1) Idaho Code § 67-5270(2) of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act; 
(2) Idaho Code § 67-6521 of the Local Land Use Planning Act; and (3) Idaho Code § 67-
6519(4). Id. at *2-3. This Court failed to find any of Giltner Dairy's arguments persuasive. Id. 
at *3. Because "Giltner Dairy could not point to any statute authorizing a petition for judicial 
review," and "because there was no statute authorizing Giltner Dairy to file a petition for judicial 
review of the decision to amend the comprehensive plan map," this Court affirmed the district 
court's decision to dismiss Giltner's petition, and awarded attorney fees to the prevailing parties. 
Id. at *3-4. 
Appellant Powderhom's Reply Brief 
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With respect to Giltner Dairy's first argument, wherein it asserted it was entitled to 
judicial review pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5270(2) of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, 
this Court rejected the same, holding that the Jerome County Board of Commissioners is not an 
agency under the Act, and thus the Act did not provide for judicial review. Id. at * I. With 
respect to Giltner Dairy's second argument, Giltner Dairy contended that it was an "affected 
person" pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6521, which grants the right of judicial review to an 
"affected person aggrieved by a decision." Id. at *2. Giltner Dairy asserted that it constituted an 
"affected person within the meaning of the Act;" that is, it argued it had an interest in real 
property "adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." 
Id. The Court disagreed, holding that since an amendment to a comprehensive plan does not 
authorize any development, "but merely serves as a guide to local government agencies charged 
with making zoning decision," Giltner Dairy could not be an affected person under Idaho Code § 
67-652l(l)(a). Id. Thus, the Court held that Idaho Code§ 67-6521 did not provide Giltner any 
right to seek judicial review of the Board's decision to amend its comprehensive land map. Id. at 
3. With respect to Giltner's third argument pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6519, this Court 
likewise rejected the same. Id. 
ii. Applying the holding in Giltner Dairy to the facts of this case establishes that 
the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over Neighbor's Petition for 
Judicial Review. 
In this case, Neighbors' arguments that it is entitled to seek judicial review of the Board's 
decision to amend the County's Comprehensive Plan are the same, or very similar to, those made 
by Giltner Dairy. Namely, Neighbors argues it is entitled to judicial review as a matter of right 
and pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-652l(l)(a)&(d) of the Local Land Use Planning Act, and 
Appellant Powderhom's Reply Brief 
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pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5270 of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. However, the 
precedent set by this Court in Giltner validates and supports the arguments set forth in 
Powderhorn's opening brief to the effect that Neighbors is not entitled to judicial review of the 
Board's decision to amend the County's Comprehensive Plan. 
As stated above, Neighbors first argues on appeal that it is entitled to seek judicial review 
of the Board's decision to amend the County's Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Idaho Code § 
67-652I(l)(a)&(d) of the Local Land Use Planning Act. (Respondent's Brief, p.3.) As an initial 
matter, Neighbor's does not so much argue, but rather flatly asserts without citation to any legal 
authority or case Jaw, that "Neighbors et al are affected persons within the meaning of the Local 
Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code§ 67-6521 (1) (a) and (d)." (Respondent's Brief, p.3.) This 
Court has previously held that when issues presented on appeal "are not supported by 
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered." St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Ctr. v. Bannon, 128 Idaho 41, 44, 910 P.2d 155, 158 (1995). Because 
Neighbors' naked assertion that it is an affected person entitled to judicial within the meaning of 
Idaho Code § 67-6521 is unsupported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, it should 
not be considered on appeal by this Court. Id. 
However, even assuming Neighbors properly set forth argument regarding Idaho Code § 
67-6521, its argument would be unavailing. Idaho Code§ 67-652l(l)(d) provides as follows: 
An affected person aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight (28) days 
after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial 
review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code. 
( emphasis added.) The Local Land Use Planning Act limits the term "affected person," to "one 
having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of 
a permit authorizing the development." LC. § 67-652l(l)(a) (emphasis added.) In its opening 
Appellant Powderhorn's Reply Brief 
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brief, Powderhorn argued at length that Neighbors did not constitute an "affected person," since 
Powderhorn's application to Kootenai County requesting that the County amend the County's 
Comprehensive Plan did not seek the issuance of a permit for development. (Powderhorn 
Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-16.) 
Briefly stated, Powderhom cited to Urrita v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357-58, 2 
P.3d 738, 742-43 (2000) in its opening brief to support its proposition that "(a] decision by a city 
or county to amend its comprehensive plan does not permit or deny the authorization of any 
development," because "a comprehensive plan does not operate as legally controlling zoning 
law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making 
zoning decisions." (Powderhom Appellants' Brief, p.16.) In Giltner Dairy, this Court 
established that since an amendment to a comprehensive plan does not authorize any 
development, "but merely serves as a guide to local government agencies charged with making 
zoning decision," a person seeking review of a comprehensive plan amendment could not be an 
affected person under Idaho Code§ 67-652l(l)(a). Giltner, 2008 WL 803001 at *2. Thus, like 
Giltner Dairy in the above-mentioned case, Neighbors is not an affected person pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 67-6521(1), and Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1) does not provide Neighbors any right to seek 
judicial review of the Board's decision to amend the Comprehensive Plan as a result. Id. at 3. 
Neighbors next argues that it is entitled to seek judicial review of the Board's decision to 
amend the County's Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5270(3) of the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 13.) Idaho Code § 67-5270(3) provides 
as follows: 
A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an agency other 
than the industrial commission or the public utilities commission is entitled to 
judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with the requirements of 
sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code. 
Appellant Powderhom's Reply Brief 
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The above-mentioned statute, by its terms, provides judicial review to a party aggrieved by a 
final order of an "agency." LC. § 67-5270(3). However, as this Court has made clear, 
"[ c ]ounties and city governments are considered local governing bodies rather than agencies for 
the purposes of IAPA." Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dept., 139 Idaho 5, 7, 72 P.3d 845, 847 
(2003). The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act is not intended to govern the judicial review of 
decisions made by local governing bodies. Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. City 
Council of City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651, 653, 8 P.3d 646, 648 (2000). Thus, Idaho Code§ 67-
5270(3) does not entitle Neighbors to seek judicial review of the Board's decision to amend the 
County's Comprehensive Plan in this case since the Board is not an agency within the meaning 
of the statute. See e.g., Giltner Dairy, LLC, 2008 WL 80300 l at * 1 (holding that since Board of 
County Commissioners in Jerome County is not an agency, "the IAPA does not by its terms 
apply"). 
In sum, Neighbors argues on appeal that two statutes - Idaho Code§ 67-652l(l)(a)&(d) 
and Idaho Code § 67-5270(3) - entitled it to seek judicial review of the Board's decision to 
amend the County's Comprehensive Plan. As set forth above, neither statute permits judicial 
review of the Board's decision in this case. As a result, the district court erred in exercising 
jurisdiction over the Neighbor's Petition for Judicial Review. The fact that Neighbors does not 
point to any statutory authority authorizing a petition for judicial review is dispositive of this 
case and renders moot the remaining issues set forth by Neighbors in its Respondent's brief. 
Notwithstanding, Powderhorn will address the remainder of Neighbors' arguments out of an 
abundance of caution. 
C. The Board's Order of Decision constitutes a legislative matter not subject to direct 
judicial review under the Local Land Use Planning Act. 
Appellant Powderhorn's Reply Brief 
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In its opening brief, Powderhom argued that the district court erred in entertaining 
judicial review of the Board's decision to amend the County's Comprehensive Plan because the 
Board's decision was a legislative matter not subject to direct judicial review. (Powderhom 
Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-21.) In support of its contention, Powderhom cited the rule adopted by 
this Court in Cooper v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 411, 614 P.2d 
947,951 (1980) ("Cooper Rule"), distinguishing between legislative and quasi-judicial actions of 
local zoning bodies: 
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of 
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited 
review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary 
abuse of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the permissible 
use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of 
judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test. ... 
Basically, this test involves the determination of whether action produces a 
general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interest, 
or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy to 
specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the former determination is 
satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the 
action is judicial. 
(Powderhom Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-21.) Neighbors argued in response that a county's 
decision to amend its comprehensive plan is not legislative, but rather constitutes an appealable 
action. (Respondent's Brief, p.14) Neighbor's argument to this effect, which argument 
constituted the bulk of its Respondent's Brief, is unavailing. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 14-23.) 
Powderhom does not wish to rehash the argument set forth in its opening brief on this 
issue, but will merely supplement its argument with this Court's recent analysis regarding the 
relationship between a comprehensive plan and a zoning designation as set forth in Giltner 
Dairy, LLC, 2008 WL 803001 at *2-3. In that case, this Court cited with approval the following 
passage regarding the nature of comprehensive plans: 
Appellant Powderhom's Reply Brief 
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[T]here is a substantial difference between planning and zoning. Planning is long 
range; zoning is immediate. Planning is general; zoning is specific. Planning 
involves political processes; zoning is a legislative function and an exercise of the 
police power. Planning is generally dynamic while zoning is more or less static. 
Planning often involves frequent changes; zoning designations should not. 
Planning has a speculative impact upon property values, while zoning may 
actually constitute a valuable property right. 
It seems clear, therefore, that while zoning designations should generally follow 
and be consistent with the long-range designations established in the 
Comprehensive Plan, there is no requirement that zoning immediately conform to 
the Plan. The Plan is a statement oflong-range public intent; zoning is an exercise 
of power which, in the long run, should be consistent with that intent. Planning is 
a determination of public policy, and zoning, to be a legitimate exercise of police 
power should be in furtherance of that policy. 
Giltner Dairy, LLC, 2008 WL 803001 at *2-3 (emphasis added). Thus, a county's decision with 
respect to planning (i.e., the comprehensive plan) is a general long term public policy decision. 
Id. 
The above-mentioned passage from Giltner Dairy, LLC is consistent with and supports 
Powderhom's argument that the Board's decision to amend Kootenai County's Comprehensive 
Plan was legislative in nature and not subject to direct judicial review. It is further consistent 
with this Court's holding in Cooper, wherein this Court stated "[i]t is beyond dispute that the 
promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances is legislative action." 
Cooper, 101 Idaho at 409, 614 P.2d at 949 (emphasis added). The practical effect of the Cooper 
Rule is that zoning decisions characterized as "legislative" are not subject to direct judicial 
review under the Local Land Use Planning Act. 1 See e.g., Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, I 05 Idaho 
at 68, 665 P.2d at 1078 (1983) (holding, "[l]egislative action is shielded from direct judicial 
review"). Thus, in this case, the district court erred in determining that it had the authority to 
directly review a legislative action of the Board. 
1 The term "direct judicial review" has been defined as "an appellate process by which land use decisions by local authorities are appealed to a 
judicial forum." Burt v. City of Idaho Fa[/.<;, 105 Idaho at 66 fn,2, 655 P.2d at 1077 fn.2. 
Appellant Powderhom's Reply Brief 
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D. Declaratory relief is not proper in a petition for judicial review. 
In its opening brief, Powderhorn set forth argument establishing that the district court 
erred in permitting Neighbors to amend its Petition for Judicial review to add a declaratory relief 
claim. (Powderhorn Appellant's Brief, pp. 25-26.) In response, Neighbors argued that its 
amendment to its Petition for Judicial Review of a claim for declaratory judgment was allowable. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.26.) For the reasons set forth below, Neighbors' argument, as set forth in 
its Respondent's Brief is unavailing. 
Appellants Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H.F Magnuson ("Coeur d'Alene Land 
Company"), at pages 22-24 of their opening brief, have set forth argument and authority 
supporting the position that the district court erroneously allowed Neighbors' Amended Petition 
for Judicial Review to include a claim for declaratory relief. (Coeur d'Alene Land Company 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-24.) Additionally, Appellants Coeur d'Alene Land Company, at pages 
26-27 of their opening brief, have set forth argument and authority supporting the proposition 
that the district court's memorandum opinion, to the extent predicated upon Neighbors' claim for 
declaratory relief, violates due process. (Coeur d'Alene Land Company Appellant's Brief, pp. 
26-27.) The above-mentioned arguments and authorities are incorporated herein as though set 
forth in full. 
In addition, Idaho law dictates that a legislative action, such as a county board's decision 
to amend its comprehensive plan cannot be attached directly via a petition for judicial review. 
Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho, 65, 66, 665 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1983). "Direct judicial 
review" has been defined by this Court as "an appellate process by which land use decisions by 
local authorities are appealed to a judicial forum." Id. at fu.2. In this case, Neighbors 
wrongfully attempted to directly attack the Board's decision via a declaratory judgment action 
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contained in its petition for judicial review. Such an attack is prohibited by this Court's ruling in 
Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho, 65, 66, 665 P.2d I 075, 1076 (1983). 
E. Assuming Arguendo that the Board's decision to amend the County's 
Comprehensive Plan was appealable, the district court erred in preserving the 
Board's decision under the Local Land Use Planning Act. 
In its opening brief, Powderhom set forth an argument establishing that the district court 
erred in vacating and remanding the Board's decision to amend the County's Comprehensive 
Plan pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279 because (I) the Board's decision did not violate any 
subsection of Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), and (2) the Board's decision did not prejudice any of 
Neighbors' substantial rights pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279(4). (Powderhom Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 27-37.) Neighbors did not directly respond to this line of argument in its 
Respondent's Brief, but merely stated that Idaho Code § 67-6509(b) justified the district court's 
decision to vacate and remand the Board's decision. (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) However, this 
assertion standing alone does not justify the district court's decision to vacate the Board's 
decision to amend the County's Comprehensive Plan. 
As set forth in further detail in Powderhom's opening brief, Idaho Code § 67-5279 
places several limitations on a reviewing court's scope ofreview when reviewing agency actions 
on appeal. A reviewing court under such circumstances must satisfy a two-tiered process before 
it may overrule an agency's order or decision pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279. First, the 
reviewing court must determine that the agency's decision: (a) violates statutory or constitutional 
provisions; (b) exceeds the agency's statutory authority; ( c) was made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole; or (e) is arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3); Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of 
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Water Resources, 138 Idaho 83 I, 836, 70 P.3d 669, 674 (2003). Second, in the event the 
reviewing court finds that tier one is satisfied, it must then find that the agency's action 
prejudiced substantial rights of the appellant. LC.§ 67-5279(4). If either tier is not satisfied, the 
reviewing court must affirm the agency decision. LC.§ 67-5279(3) & (4). 
In this case, the district court found, and Neighbors argues on appeal, that the Board's 
decision to amend the County's Comprehensive Plan was made upon unlawful procedure. (R., 
Vol. 3, pp. 599, 600); (Respondent's Brief, p.13). Specifically, the district court found, and 
Neighbors argues, that the Board's decision was unlawful because it failed to comply with the 
procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 67-6509(b). For the reasons set forth in Powderhorn's 
opening brief, the district erred in so finding and Neighbor's argument is unavailing. 
(Powderhorn Appellant's Brief, pp. 28-34.) 
However, even assuming the Board's decision was made upon unlawful procedure, the 
Board's decision must be affirmed by a reviewing court unless a substantial right of the appellant 
has been prejudiced. LC. § 67-5279(4). The party attacking an agency's decision bears the 
burden of establishing that "a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced." Angstman v. 
City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409, 412 (Ct. App. 1996). In this case, Neighbors 
not only failed to establish that any of its substantial rights had been prejudiced by the Board's 
Final Order amending the Comprehensive Plan, but it failed to even set forth any argument 
addressing the issue of the substantial rights below or on appeal. See R., Vol. 1, pp. 119-146. 
Furthermore, the district court failed to address, or make any finding with respect to, what 
substantial right had been prejudiced by the Board's Final Order. See R., Vol. 3, pp. 590-602 
(Respondent's Brief). Because Neighbors failed to set forth any argument below or on appeal 
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that any of Neighbor's substantial rights had been prejudiced by the Board's decision to amend 
its comprehensive plan, LC.§ 67-5279(4) dictates that the Board's decision be affirmed. 
F. The District Court erred in granting costs to Neighbors below. 
In its opening brief, Powderhorn set forth argument that the district court erred m 
awarding costs to Neighbors below. (Powderhorn Appellant's Brief, pp. 38-39.) In its 
Respondent's Brief, Neighbors failed to set forth any argument in response to rebut 
Powderhorn's assertion that, as a result of its erroneous decision to vacate the Board's decision, 
the district court erred in awarding Neighbors' costs below. For the reasons set forth in this Brief 
and in Powderhorn's opening brief, Neighbors should not have been the prevailing party below, 
and district court erred in granting Neighbors an award of costs as a result. Powderhorn 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's award of costs to Neighbors. 
G. Powderhorn is entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs in this matter. 
In its opening brief, Powderhorn argued that it is entitled to recoup its attorney fees 
associated with this matter from Neighbors. (Powderhorn Brief, p.39-40.) Neighbors argues in 
its Respondent's Brief that attorney's fees are not allowable to anyone in this matter. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 35-36.) For the reasons set forth below, Neighbors' arguments are 
unavailing and Powderhorn is entitled to recoup its attorney's fees and costs related to this 
matter. 
i. Powderhorn is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, Powderhorn is 
entitled to an award of its costs and attorneys' fees on appeal. Idaho Code § 12-117 provides the 
following: 
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(I) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
(2) If the prevailing party is awarded a partial judgment and the court finds the 
party against whom partial judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law, the court shall allow the prevailing party's attorney's fees, witness 
fees and expenses in an amount which reflects the person's partial recovery. 
This Court has held that when an individual or agency "has no authority to take a particular 
action, it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law" pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. 
Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2004). 
Neighbors asserts on appeal that Powderhorn has "misread the law" by asserting that it is 
entitled to attorney's fees in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.35.) Specifically, Neighbors argues, without any citation to supporting case law, that Idaho 
Code § 12-117 only "allows for the award of attorney's fees to 'a person' (not from a person) 
from 'A state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district' when the judgment is rendered 
determining that the governmental agency 'acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."' 
(Respondent's Brief, p.35.) Neighbors' unsupported interpretation of Idaho Code § 12-117 is 
erroneous. 
As an initial matter, Idaho Code§ 12-117 does not preclude an award of attorney's fees 
from "a person" as asserted by Neighbors. A "person" for the purposes of Idaho Code§ 12-117 
is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association or any other private 
organization." LC. § 12-1!7(4). Contrary to Neighbors' unsupported assertion, this Court has 
previously held that a person may be required to pay attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-117 where that person brings an action without a reasonable basis in law or fact. See e.g., 
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Giltner Dairy, LLC, 2008 WL 803001 at *3 (holding that a limited liability company was 
required to pay opposing party's attorney fees where it brought an action without a reasonable 
basis in law or fact). 
Likewise, Neighbors' unsupported assertion that Idaho Code§ 12-117 only allows for the 
award of attorney's where a governmental agency acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law 
is erroneous. (Respondent's Brief, p.35.) This Court has previously held that a non-
governmental party may be required to pay the opposing parties' attorney's fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-117 where that non-governmental party acted without a reasonable basis in law 
or fact in bringing the action. See e.g., Giltner Dairy, LLC, 2008 WL 803001 at *3 (holding that 
a limited liability company was required to pay opposing party's attorney fees where it brought 
an action without a reasonable basis in law or fact). As a result, Neighbors has failed to set forth 
any persuasive argument as to why Powderhorn should be denied its request for attorney's fees 
in this matter. 
This Court's recent holding in Giltner Dairy, LLC, 2008 WL 803001 at *3-4 is 
controlling in this case with respect to an award of attorney's fees. In that case, a landowner, 
Golf Ranch, LLC, petitioned the Jerome County Planning and Zoning Commission to amend the 
Jerome County Comprehensive Plan with respect to certain property it owned. Giltner, 2008 
WL 803001 *I. The Jerome County Board of Commissioners approved the request and 
effectuated a revised comprehensive plan map amendment. Id. A neighboring landowner, 
Giltner Dairy, LLC, filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision to amend the 
County's Comprehensive Plan. Id. When the district court affirmed, Giltner Dairy appealed to 
the Idaho Supreme Court, wherein this Court found that Giltner Dairy could not point to any 
statute authorizing a petition for judicial review. Id. at *3. This Court found that Giltner Dairy 
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acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact as a result and required it to pay attorney's fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. Id. 
This case, like Giltner, involved a County (i.e., Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners), a party requesting an amendment to the County's Comprehensive Plan (i.e., 
Powderhorn), and a party who filed a petition for judicial review of the County's decision to 
grant the request for a Comprehensive Plan amendment without having the statutory authority to 
do so (i.e., Neighbors). Furthermore, in this case, Neighbors, like Giltner, cannot point to any 
statute authorizing a petition for judicial review in this case. As a result, Neighbors acted 
without any reasonable basis in law or fact when it filed its petition for judicial review in this 
matter. This Court's holding in Giltner establishes that Powderhorn is entitled to an award of its 
attorney's fees in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
It should also be noted that Powderhorn' s request for attorney fees and costs in this 
matter is further justified by the fact that the district court improperly granted a stay at 
Neighbors' request without requiring Neighbors to post a bond pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 84(m) to protect Powderhorn from the unnecessary cost imposed by the delay. As set 
forth in further detail in Powderhorn's opening brief, shortly following the filing of its first 
Petition for Judicial Review, Neighbors filed a Motion to Stay, requesting that the district court 
stay Kootenai County from conducting the scheduled public hearings for five zone change 
application proceedings related to the Powderhorn Peninsula pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 84(m).2 (R., Vol. 1, p.2). Powderhorn's zone change application proceeding was one 
of the five Neighbors wished to stay. Id. The district court granted Neighbors' motion, and 
2 Neighbors moved to staying the following five zone change applications: (l) Kootenai County Planning Case No. Z-787-06, In Re; Powderhom 
Zone Change Application; (2) Kootenai County Planning Case No. Z.-788-06, In Re: Charles R. Blakley Zone Change Application; (3) Kootenai 
County Planning Case No. Z..788-06, In Ile: H.F. Magnuson and Coeur d'Alene Land Company Zone Change Application; (4) Kootenai County 
Planning Case No. Z-790-06, In Re: East Point Farms Zone Change Application; and (5) Kootenai Courity Planning Case No, z~ 791-06, In Re: 
Bia Bar Inc. Zone Change Application. 
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imposed a stay upon the above-mentioned zone change application proceedings without 
imposing a bond or applying any terms. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 93-95.) The stay barred Powderhom 
( and all other Powderhom Peninsula landowners) from proceeding with the pending zone change 
proceedings for the duration of the appeal, at great expense to Powderhom. Id. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(m) provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of a petition for judicial review 
with the district court does not automatically stay the proceedings and 
enforcement of the action of an agency that is subject to the petition. Unless 
prohibited by statute, the agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a 
stay upon appropriate terms. 
The Rule provides little guidance on when a court should stay a proceeding before an agency 
after the filing of a petition for judicial review, and no Idaho case law has addressed the issue. 
However, the Rule does state that if a court does impose a stay under such a situation, it must do 
so upon appropriate terms. I.R.C.P. 84(m). 
In this case, the district court did not impose any terms or bond when it imposed a stay 
upon Powderhom's zone change application proceeding, but merely provided the following: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Neighbors'] Motion for Stay be, and it is 
hereby granted and that respondent Kootenai County is stayed from conducting 
the scheduled public hearing on requests by Powderhom Communities, LLC and 
other for changes in zoning classification from Agricultural to Rural on Kootenai 
County Building and Planning Department Cases Nos. Z-7878-06, Z-78806, Z-
790-06 and Z-791-06 until such time as the Court enters a final decision upon the 
Petition for Judicial Review of the change to the Comprehensive Plan. 
(R., Vol. 1, p.95.) The imposition of the stay resulted in the hardship, inconvenience, and 
financial burden to Powderhom. In particular, the stay adversely and directly affected 
Powderhom in the significant amount of attorney's fees it incurred defending this action at the 
district court level and subsequently pursuing this action on appeal. Powderhom should be 
entitled to recoup its expenses by receiving an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
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ii. Powderhorn is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
In addition, Powderhorn is entitled to an award of its costs and attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Idaho Code § 12-121 provides as 
follows: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The 
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Attorney's fees under this provision will be awarded when the action was either brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 
Idaho 624,903 P.2d 1321 (1995). 
In Giltner Dairy, LLC, 2008 WL 803001 at *4, this Court held that a party - Giltner 
Diary - acted frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation for the purposes of Idaho Code § 
12-121 where that party filed a petition for judicial review ofa County's decision to amend the 
comprehensive plan when there was no statute authority to do so. As a result, this Court required 
Giltner Diary to pay attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. In this case, like in 
Giltner, Neighbors filed a petition for judicial review without the statutory authority to do so, 
thus acting frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation for the purposes of Idaho Code § 
12-121. As a result, Powderhorn is entitled to an award of its attorney fees and costs in this 
matter pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
As stated above, it should also be noted that Powderhorn' s request for attorney fees and 
costs in this matter is further justified by the fact that the district court improperly granted a stay 
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at Neighbors' request without requiring Neighbors to post a bond pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 84(m) to protect Powderhorn from the unnecessary financial costs imposed by the 
delay. 
H. Neighbors has waived any claim it may have to recover attorney's fee at the district 
court level or on appeal, and as such is barred from seeking attorney fees. 
In this case, Neighbors failed to make any request, present argument, or otherwise 
contend that it has any claim to recovery attorney's fee at the district court level or on appeal in 
its Respondent's Brief. Thus, as a matter of Jaw, Neighbors has waived any argument it may 
have that it is entitled to attorney fees at the district court level or on appeal, and thus is barred 
from seeking attorney's fees in this matter. See, I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 
665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005); Weaver v. Searle Bros, 131 Idaho 610, 962 P.2d 381 (1998). 
III. CONCLUSION 
Powderhorn respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Board's Final Order. In 
addition, Powderhorn respectfully requests that this Court grant its request for attorney's fees and 
costs. Last, Powderhorn respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's award of 
cost to Neighbors below. 
Dated this ~Jday of April, 2008. 
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